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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JL;\_RDIXGE
PORATED,

CO~lP~-\XY.

IXCOR-

Respondent,
Case No.
8000

\S.

THE EIMCO

CORPOR_._~TION,

Appellant.

STATE)IENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor
of Hardinge after a pre-trial conference at which the
pertinent facts were all stipulated or covered by documents and statements filed with respective motions for
summary judgment filed by each of the parties, requests
for admissions and answers thereto, interrogatories and
answers thereto. Appellant Eimco Corporation's principal defense is the statute of limitations, and the question raised on this appeal is whether the obligation of
Eimco to Hardinge, if any, is founded on an instrument
in writing within the meaning of Section 78-12-23, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, or is ·subject to the four or three-

1
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year limitations provided by Section 78-12-25 and iS12-26 (3), Utah Code Annotated.
In March, 1945, Hardinge and Eimco entered into
a contract in writing (R. 20-23), for the supply by Eimco
to Hardinge of certain "U taloy" steel liner plates for
shipment to the U. S. S. R. under lend lease proYisions.
The original purchase order issued by Hardinge provided,
"PRICE: $10.40 per cwt. f.o.b. York, Penna ..,

(R. 20).

,

On April 19, 1945, Hardinge issued its alteration No. B
to the purchase order (R. 25) which provided, among
other things,
"This alteration order also corrects the price
to $9.40 per cwt. f.o.b. York, Pennsylvania, instead
of $10.40 per cwt. as originally specified. 'l_1he
$10.40 per cwt. as shown on the order was a typographical error. The price of $9.40 per cwt. i8 in
accordance with our agreement with Mr. David
E. Morganstern, Service Engineer."
This reduction in price was accepted by Eimco (R. -+ 7)
but with some protest and subsequent claim that the
reduction was obtained by false representations, all of
which has colored the controversy which gave risr to
this action (R_.. 76). On July 9, 1945, Hardinge issued
its alteration No. E to the purchase order (R. 29) whieh
provided,
"Ship via frieght collect on Govt. Bill of 1~~
ing, to : U. S·. Treasury D·ept., Procuretnen~ Dl.Vlsion, do Commanding Officer, Marietta lloldm~
2
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and Reconsigntnent Pt., l\lurietta, }>pnn~ylvania.
Route via DRG-\\T- l\IO·P AC - PRR."
The lTtaloy steel liner plates called for hy the eontract \vere manufactured by Eilnco and shipped collect
on a Governtnent bill of lading to the con1n1anding officer at the Marietta Holding and Reconsignment Point,
all as provided on alteration order E. Shipments were
made on July 16, :21 and :25, 1945. Shipments constituted
four hundred sL.xty-one thousand eight hundred ninetythree (461,893) pounds for a total contract price of
Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventeen and
94/100 Dollars ($43,417.94), which was invoiced ·by
Eimco to Hardinge on July 25, 1945, (R. 48) and paid
by Hardinge on _A_ugust 6, 1945 (R. 18). S.ometime
between that date and September 17, 1945, Hardinge discovered that the United States Government had charged
back to Hardinge the freight on the shipment (R. 49),
and that no change had been made in the -eontract provision of $9.40 per cwt. to allow for the change in the
f.o.b. points. On September 17, 1945, an invoice for
freight was sent to Eimco by Hardinge (R. 50) and on
October 17, 1945, a second request for payment of that
invoice was made. There then ensued a series of correspondence between Harding and Eimco with regard to
the 1natter and finally this action was commenced on
September 26, 19'49, by service of Summons (R. 4).
The freight bill submitted by the government to
Hardinge was actually paid by Hardinge on December
26, 1945 ( R. 60, 61), and there is a dispute as to the
3
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correct amount to be charged back to Eimco if this action
is not barred by the statute of li1nitations and the Court
should find that there is some obligation on the part of
Eimco to pay freight. Eilnco contends that its obligation, if any, is only on the weight actually shipped and
billed by it, to-wit: 461,893 pounds, at the rate at \Yhirh
freight "\Vas charged back by the United States, while
Hardings claims it is entitled to the freight rate of
$1.43 per cwt. from Salt Lake to Pennsylvania, nlultiplied by the number of pounds at which the Govern1nent
charged back the freight. The trial court allowed the
a1nount actually charged back by the Governn1ent, but
a different weight.
Although the trial court made findings of fact and
conclusions of law after the hearing at the pre-trial
conference (R. 87 and 90), it is not clear on \vhat ba~i~
the court did determine Eimco's liability. It is apparently on the theory that the written contract, pureha~P
order No. 37898, (R. 20-29), as amended by the various
alteration orders, required Eimco to pay the freight fron1
Salt Lake to Pennsylvania, although judgment entered
for I-Iardinge was based on the amount of freight actually
charged back by the United States to Hardinge (R. 8~,
R. 60).
Eimco has also counterclaimed for an1ounts (lue it
on other contracts subsequent to the one in issue, and
the a1nount of the judg1nent a\varded 1-Iardinge is suhject to the amounts due on those contraets. No issue i~
raised by either part~T on thi~ appeal a~ to the ruling~ of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the trial courts on the amounts due on the counterclaim.
The controlling question before this court is whether
the right of the purchaser to have an adjustment in the
contract price of $9.40 per cwt. to compensate for a
change in the contract as to payment of freight and the
n1ethod and routing of shipment, when nothing is said
in the contract on the subject, is founded .on a contract
in writing or is a right in quasi-contract based on mistake
or unjust enrichn1ent. It is appellant's contention here
that it is the latter.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. HARDINGE'S RIGHTS, IF ANY, ARE NOT FOUNDED
ON A CONTRACT IN WRITING.

II. THE ONLY RELIEF TO WHICH HARDINGE MAY
BE ENTITLED UNDER QUASI-CONTRACT PRINCIPLES IS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIO~~S.
III. THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT FOR FREIGHT ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR.

ARGUMENT
I. HARDINGE'S RIGHTS, IF ANY, ARE NOT FOUNDED
ON A CONTRACT IN WRITING.

The contract, as finally performed after seve-ral
written modifications, p-rovided for a price of $9.40 cwt.
shipped freight collect on government bill of lading to
the Marietta Holding and Reconsignment Point via the
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad, the Missouri
Pacific Railroad, and the Pennsylvania Railroad. There
is nothing said about Eimco paying or absorbing the
5
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freight or about an adjustn1ent of the price to allow for
the change in the arrangements as to the freight or the
change in the method of shipment and the ultimate
destination.

In short, the written contract between

Hardinge and Eimco at the date of shipment provided
that the government would pay the freight to l\Iarietta,
Pennsylvania, that Eimco was to ship the castings via
the Denver and Rio Grande, the Missouri Pacific and
the Pennsylvania Railroads to that point and that
Hardinge was to pay Eimco $9.40 per cwt. This contract was performed to the letter. What Hardinge is
now seeking by this action is not damages for breach of
that contract but equitable relief to change the contract
to insert something the parties themselves neglected to
state therein.
F-or Hardinge to be entitled to any refund fron1
Eimco founded on the written contract between the
parties there must be something in the written contraet
so providing. The change in the contract giving rise to
the controversy between the parties, did 1nore than
change the provision as to freight. It changed the ultimate destination from York to Marietta. It speeified
the routing of the shipment and switched the risk of
loss in transit. Under the original contract, "f.o.b. York,H
meant that Ein1co's price of .$10.40 included freight to
that destination, but how much freight was absorbed in
that composite price is· not apparent from the contrart.
Under the original contract Eimco could route the ~hip
lnent in any way and by such carriers a~ it eho~e in ordPr
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to save \Yhatever shipping cost it could by such routing.
linder the change it had to ship via the railroads specified. Confined to the four corners of a written document
ho"T is a court to n1ake allo\vance for these· changes in
adjusting the price for the parties vvhen they neglected
to do so~ As stated by this court in

Bracklein vs. R.ealty Insurance Company, 95 Utah
490, 80 Pac. 2d -±71, at ±76:
HA cause of action is not founded on a written
instrument merely because it is indirectly connected with the instrun1ent. And the fact that a
written instrument 1nay be a link in the chain of
evidence establishing the liability is not sufficient
to say the cause of action is founded on such writing, nor is a parol acceptance of a written offer,
alone, sufficient, to make an agreen1ent in writing
within the statute."
Suppose, for example, change order E had read Portland, Maine instead of Marietta, Pennsylvania~ Would
not the parties have had to make some express agreement with respect to adjusting the price to reflect the
· increase in the freight due to the changed destination~
Or suppose Eimco had a rate of $1.2'5 per cwt. quoted
by the Union Pacific-New York Central~ Would not
Eimco have had to absorb the loss when the change order
specified Denver and Rio Grande-Missouri Pacificl)ennsylvania Railroad unless some express adjustment
were made in the written contract~
It may be admitted that the change in th~ written
('Ontract to place the burden of freight payment on the
7
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Government without a change in the price of $9.-!0 per
cwt. in this particular case gave Ein1co a 'vindfall, but
until the written contract price is changed can Hardinge
say that Eimco received more than the written contract
provided~

Under the original contract the Governn1ent played
no part. By change order E a Government bill of lading
was interposed. A Government bill of lading is a contract between the carrier and the Government whereby
the Government pays the freight. It is often employed
by the Government to obtain for itself the benefits of
land grant rates and/ or special rates under Section 2:2 of
the Interstate Commerce Act, not available to ordinary
commercial shippers. Whether the Governn1ent "Tould
pass back to Hardinge the freight that the Governn1ent
paid to the carrier would, of course, depend upon the
terms of the contract between the Governn1ent and
Hardinge. So far as the written contract between
Hardinge and Eimco vvas concerned, after change ordPr
E was issued the Government was to pay the freight.
Adjusting the change. in the economic advantage of that
assumption of a burden by the Governn1ent is something
beyond the written contract between Hardinge and Ein1co
as it stood in 1945 and as it stands now. Oiving I-Iardinge
relief in this action cannot be founded on that 'vritten
contract but rests in the realm of fireside equity and
restitution.
It is submitted that the case at bar is striking]y like
the situation in
8
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BTo-tcn vs. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 Pac. 2d 881.
In that ease the Plaintiff \Yas purchaser of real estate
under a \Yritten contract. The seller claimed default and
repossessed the property. Later the buyer brought an
action to recoYer the pay1nents made on the contract and
to assert on equitable lien on the property to secure
said repayn1ents. Defendant seller raised the defense
of the statute of limitations and the issue before this
court \vas \vhether the right of the buyer to recover the
1noney under the contract was founded on a contract in
writing. S.peaking for a unanimous court, Justice I-Ianson
said:
HThe contract of purchase and sale involved
in this action does not contain any express provision giving plaintiffs, as purchasers, a right to
recover the purchase money paid by them in the
event of the defendant's failure or refusal to perfornl, nor does it give, by express provision a
vendee's lien for such payn1ents . . . . We must
consider first \Yhether plaintiff's right to recover
the purchase money paid by them is founded
upon the written contract although it contains no
express provision covering such right. If founded
upon such con tract, then Section 104-2-22 R. S .
. 1933, fixing the limitation at 6 years would be.
applicable. We are of the opinion that plaintiffs'
right to recover the pay1nents made by the1n rests,
not upon the written contract, but upon an implied
promise, created by law, of defendants to repay
the purchase money paid if they should default
in the performance of the contract. The action
could not be based upon the written contract, for
it contained no promise by defendants to return
the purchase price. While it is true that the
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payments were rnade under the written contract
and the relations of the parties were to that extent
affected by the writing, yet that instrument is not
declared on in the action to recover the payments
made as a basis of the right to recover. It is onlY
an incident to the accrual of the right to recove1:.
The basis for recovery rests upon the implied
promise of defendants to return the purchase
money which the law creates fro1n their duty to
return it upon failure by them to perform the
contract and give plaintiffs what they contracted
for. The action rests in implied assumpsit as for
money had and received."
In
Petty and Rid:dle, Inc. vs. L'lllnt, 104 Utah 130, 138

Pac. 2d 648,
there was no express agreement to pay the bills of the
corporation. The written contract n1erely provided,
"The balance to be divided equally after all
bills payable are paid from the monies on hand.H
This court rejected a contention that the action to recovPr
defendants' share of certain bills later discovered wa~
founded on a contract in writing, stating,
"Nor would the action be one upon a contract,
obligation or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing under the provisions of Section 10-t2-22 R.S.U. 1933, but would be governed by the
provisions of Section 104-·2-23 as 'not foundPd
upon an instrument in writing.' The obligation,
if any, to refund the money in this ea~e did not
arise from the written contract, but was in1posed
by law because of the circumstances under "rhich
it was· paid. The Restaten1ent of the Law of

10
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Restitution covers this field of liability under the
heading ~ ~Iistake of Fact.' Section 20 thereof
reads as follows:
'_. .-\_ person w'ho has paid another an excessive
amount of 1noney because of an erroneous belief
induced by a 1nistake of fact that the suin paid
\vas necessary for the discharge of a duty, for the
perforn1ance of a condition, or for the acceptance
of an offer, is entitled to restitution of the excess.' "
The court then cited and quoted with approval from
Brown vs. Cleverly, Supra,
and from cases from a number of other jurisdictions
and concluded that the action was barred by the statute
of limitations on the grounds that an action to recover
money paid or obtained through an honest mistake of
fact or law is an action founded upon an implied contract or liability, not in writing.
Compare the situation in the case at bar with those
cases arising out of the holding by the Supreme Court
of the United States that the pTocessing tax under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act was unconstitutional. See

U. S. vs. Butler, 297 U. S. 1.
vVhere the tax was included in the composite price and
no provision was made in the written contract for the
reduction of the price in case of change in the tax, no
recovery was allowed on the contract. See

United States vs. Standard Rice Co., 323 U. S.
106, 89 Law Ed. 104;
11
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G. S. John.son Co. vs. N. Sauer Milling Co., 14-8
Kan. 861, 84 Pac. 2d 934.
But revision of the price was allowed under the contract
when specific contractual provision was made.

United States vs~ Kansas Flour Mills Corporatio·n.
314 U. S. 212, 86 Law Ed. 159.
.Depending upon the equities of the situation, relief in
some cases was allowed to buyers, not founded on the
written contract of purchase and sale, but under quasicontract principles.

Johtnson vs. N. Sauer Milling Co., Supra;
Johnson vs. Igleheart Brothers, 95 Fed.
(C. A. 7).

~d -!

S·o in the case at bar there is no provision in the
written contract for adjustment in the price to reflPrt
the change in the method of shipment and the payn1ent
of freight and routing of the materials to Marietta.
Whatever relief Hardinge may be entitled to must ari~p·
under principles of quasi-contract.

Petty and Riddle, Inc. vs. Lunt, Supra.
II. THE ONLY RELIEF TO WHICH liARDINGE MAY
BE ENTITLED UNDER QUASI-CONTRACT PRINCIPLES IS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Assuming, arguendo, that Hardinge showed so1nP
facts upon which it 1night be entitled to relief on principles of restitution or implied contract, it is subtnitted
the applicable {Ttah statute of limitations had run hPforP

12
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the action

\Ya~

instituted.

Hardinge has t\vo theories available for seeking
relief. One, on implied contract resulting from unjust
enrichment,

Brown vs. Cleverly, Supra,
and the other for restitution of payment made by mistake,

Petty and Riddle, Inc. vs. Lwnt, Supra.
Under the unjust enrich1nent theory the cause of action
accrued 'vhen payment was made by Hardinge to Eimco
on August 6, 1945.

Leather Manrufacturer'.s Bwnk vs. Mercha~t's
National Barnk, 128 U. S. 2·6, 32 Law Ed. 1888.
In that case, speaking for the court, Justice Gray said,
"In the case at bar the plaintiffs right of
action did not depend upon any express promise
by the defendant after discovery of the mistake,
or upon any den1and by plaintiff upon defendant,
but was to recover back the money, as paid without consideration and had and received by defendant to plaintiff's use. That right accrued at the
date of payment and was barred by the statute of
limitations."
lTnder the mistake theory, which is the one apparently
adopted by Hardinge, (see affidavits in the record,
pages 49 to 70) the cause of action accrued,
"on behalf of the corporation when it discovered
that there was an overpayment and demand for

13
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restitution had been made."

Petty and Riddle, Inc. vs. Lunt, Supra, 138 Pac.
2d 648, 652.

See also

Weight vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 Pac. 899.
In the case at bar the alleged mistake was discovered
by Mr. Eberhardt in the Accounting Department of
Hardinge (R. 49), sometime between August 6, 1943
and September 17, 1945, and subsequently on September
17, 1945, a demand for payment of the freight (R. 50)
was made. Summons was served on Eimco on Septenlber 26, 1949 (R. 4) and the C.omplaint filed on October
7, 1949 ( R. 2), both dates more than four years after
the dates of discovery and demand.
Accordingly, the claim is barred on either theory, as
more than four years have elapsed between the accural
of the cause of action in 194·5 and the commencement of
this action in 1949.

Petty arnd Rid.dle, Inc. vs. Lunt, Supra;
Brown vs. Cleverly, Supra;
104-12-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943;
104-12-26 ( 3), Utah Code Annotated 1943 ~
Jeremy Fuel and Grain Compatuy vs. Denver &
Rio Gra;nde Western Railroad Co., 60 Utah
153, 207 Pac. 155.
14
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III. THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT FOR FREIGHT ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR.

Having held the action was founded on a contract
in ·wTiting, the trial court proceeded to determine the
amount to be charged Eimco for freight. Aside from
the error in its ruling on the nature of the action and the
statute of limitations applicable, it is submitted the trial
court erred in fixing the amount of adjustment due
Hardinge. The Government, in making its charge back
to Hardinge, 1nade allowance for the difference between
shipping from Salt Lake City to York and Salt Lake
City to Marietta (R. 60). This the Trial Court also
allowed (R. 88-89), charging Eimco exactly what the
Government had charged Hardinge, that is, $6,233.12.
It is submitted this amount is also erroneous as the
$6,'233.12 charged by the Government is based on a
weight of 466,900 pounds (R. 60). All Eimco shipped to
Hardinge and all Eimco was paid by Hardinge was for
461,893 pounds at $9.40 cwt. (R. 48, 64, 65). Applying
the freight rate charged by the Government of 1.335
cwt. to the weight shipped and billed by Eimco to
Hardinge gives only $6,166.27, instead of $6,233.12. If
the action is not barred by the statute of limitations the
lesser amount is all Hardinge_ is entitled to recover.
See proposed Findings of Fact, Paragraph 9 (R. 84).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing it is submitted the decision
of the Trial Court on the claims of Hardinge should be
15
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reversed and judgment in favor of Eimco on its counterclaim entered.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT
& MABE·Y,
PETER W. BILLINGS,
Attorneys for Appella.nt.
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